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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE 
MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE IN THE AFTERMATH OF UNITED 
STATES V. OAKLAND CANNABIS BUYERS' COOPERATIVE 
"[T]here are some limited circumstances in which we recommend 
smoking marijuana for medical uses." 
-National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, Con­
clusion to the Report funded by the White House Drug Policy 
Office. March 17, 1999. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215 ("Prop 
215"),1 which authorized physicians to "recommend" the use of ma­
rijuana for the treatment of a variety of maladies.2 As a result, vari­
ous groups3 organized for the purpose of providing marijuana to 
qualified individuals.4 In 1998, the United States sued one of these 
groups, Cannabis Cultivators Club, in an attempt to stop the distri­
bution of marijuana that had started as a result of Prop 215.5 The 
case eventually worked its way to the United States Supreme Court 
where, in May 2001, the Court issued a decision.6 United States v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("OCBC") highlighted the 
differences among the Supreme Court Justices regarding the con­
troversial topic of the legality of marijuana use for medical pur­
poses. In OCBC, an eight-Justice Court, with Justice Breyer 
abstaining,7 uniformly agreed that the common law defense of ne­
cessity was inapplicable to the manufacture or distribution of mari­
1. Proposition 215, Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 1362.5 (West 2002». See also infra note 68. 
2. Id. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (identifing specifically a number 
of these maladies). 
3. Examples include: Cannabis Cultivators Club, Marin Alliance for Medical Ma­
rijuana, Ukiah Cannabis Buyers Club, Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative, Flower 
Therapy Medical Marijuana Club, and Santa Cruz Cannabis Buyers Club. United 
States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
4. Id. at 1092. 
5. Id. 
6. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
7. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration and decision of DCBC be­
cause his brother, Judge Charles R. Breyer, presided over United States v. Cannabis 
Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998), the district court case that even­
tually led to DCBe. 
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juana for medical purposes. However, in the concurring opinion, 
written by Justice Stevens, three Justices disagreed with the major­
ity's suggestion that the medical necessity defense was equally inap­
plicable to use and possession violations of the Controlled 
Substances Act ("CSA")8 for medical purposes. 
This Note advances the proposition that there is a legal distinc­
tion between the distribution or manufacture of marijuana and its 
use or possession in violation of the CSA, and that the medical ne­
cessity defense should be available to a seriously ill person who uses 
or possesses marijuana for medical purposes. The basis for this pro­
position is that such result is consistent with long-standing legal 
doctrines and a contrary conclusion would be in conflict with those 
doctrines. Additionally, this proposition is not in conflict with the 
Supreme Court's holding in DeBe. 
Part I of this Note presents a brief summary of the historical 
use of marijuana for medical purposes and of the federal govern­
ment's regulation of marijuana in the United States, ultimately 
leading to the CSA. Part I then reviews the origins of the CSA, the 
role that scheduling, or drug classification, plays in drug control pol­
icy, and the history of one particular effort to reschedule marijuana 
so that it could be legally prescribed by physicians. 
Part II discusses and examines the majority and concurring 
opinions of DeBe. Finally, Part III proposes that the defense of 
medical necessity should be available in cases dealing with the use 
and possession of marijuana for medical purposes, and explores the 
substantive divergence between the majority and concurring opin­
ions in DeBe. The analysis centers on three doctrines that could 
each independently form the basis for allowing a medical necessity 
defense in cases of medical use of marijuana by seriously ill persons. 
The Note argues that, in the context of the availability of the medi­
cal necessity defense, there is a distinction between the legal treat­
ment of distribution or manufacture of medical marijuana and the 
legal treatment of its use or possession. This distinction is identified 
through the analysis of (1) the traditional availability and use of the 
defense of necessity, (2) the relevance and applicability of equitable 
jurisdiction, and (3) the doctrine of federalism. In the process, Part 
III summarizes the development and application of the necessity 
defense, the historical function and scope of courts of equity, the 
8. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.c. 
§§ 801-971 (2000). 
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relevance of the right to pain relief, and the federalist function of 
preserving a dual syst~m of government in the United States. 
The Note concludes that the medical necessity defense should 
be available to a seriously ill person who uses or possesses mari­
juana for medical purposes. Such a conclusion is consistent with the 
aforementioned doctrines, and a contrary conclusion would be in 
conflict not only with those doctrines, but also with prior Supreme 
Court decisions relating to these doctrines. 
I. HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 
A. Pre-1970 Medical Use of Marijuana 
The plant known as marijuana has been used as medicine for at 
least 5000 years.9 The world's oldest surviving text on medical 
drugs, the Chinese Shen-nung Pen-tshao Ching, specifically cites 
marijuana's ability to reduce the pain of rheumatism and treat di­
gestive disorders.!o Marijuana has been cultivated in the United 
States for its fiber content for over 400 years.!1 According to some 
historians, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson cultivated 
marijuana and advocated a hemp-based economy.12 Regarding ma­
rijuana's medicinal qualities, between 1840 and 1900, European and 
American medical journals published more than 100 articles on the 
therapeutic benefits of marijuana,13 and the drug was routinely pre­
scribed until the beginning of its regulation in the 1930's.14 Mari­
juana remained in the United States' pharmacopoeia until the 
passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in 1941,15 after which physicians 
were greatly hampered in their ability to prescribe it as a 
medicine.16 The American Medical Association was one of the 
most vocal organizations to testify against the regulation, which ef­
9. LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBID· 
DEN MEDICINE 3 (rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter "GRINSPOON & BAKALAR"]. 
10. B. ZIMMERMAN ET AL., Is MARIJUANA THE RIGHT MEDICINE FOR You? A 
FACTUAL GUIDE TO MEDICAL USES OF MARIJUANA (1998). 
11. NORML, NORML REPORT ON SIXTY YEARS OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION 
IN THE U.S. (Mar. 17,2002), at http://www.norrnl.orglindex.cfm?Group_ID=4428. 
12. JOHN ROULAC, INDUSTRIAL HEMP: PRACTICAL PRODUCTS-PAPER TO 
FABRIC TO COSMETICS 8 (1995). 
13. Lester Grinspoon, M.D. & James B. Bakalar, Marijuana as a Medicine: A 
Plea for Reconsideration, 273 JAMA 1875 (1995) (discussing historical and modern 
medical uses for marijuana). 
14. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REpORT ON MARIJUANA AND 
HEALTH 85 (1971). 
15. NORML, MEDICAL USE, at http://www.norrnl.orglindex.cfm?Group_ID= 
5441 (last updated Mar. 10, 2003). 
16. Id. 
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fectively acted as a ban, arguing that the regulatory scheme would 
deprive patients of a safe and effective medicineP The recrea­
tional use of drugs, including marijuana, increased during the 
1960's. As a result of growing legislative concern over the increased 
use of all drugs for recreation, Congress enacted the CSA in 1970. 
B. The Controlled Substances Act 
In enacting the CSA, Congress' stated objectives were the uni­
fication of law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of drug enforce­
ment efforts inside and outside the United States, compliance with 
the 1961 International Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs18 
("Single Convention") through the application of the Single Con­
vention's norms and practices, and the adoption of a legal structure 
that affords law enforcement the flexibility necessary to adapt to 
future changes in the drug culture.19 
1. Scheduling: The Classification of Drugs 
As a structural component of the CSA, Congress generated a 
classification scheme whereby each drug was classified into a cate­
gory called a "schedule. "20 Congress placed drugs into different 
schedules on the basis of predetermined factors.21 Additionally, as 
a means of ensuring the CSA's adaptation to future demands, Con­
gress built into the CSA a mechanism for the rescheduling of drugs, 
17. American Medical Association Legislative Counsel William C. Woodword 
testified before Congress on July 12, 1937, against the Marijuana Tax Act. 	He stated: 
We cannot understand ... why this bill should have been prepared in secret 
for two years without any initiative, even to the profession, that it was being 
prepared. . .. The obvious purpose and effect of this bill is to impose so many 
restrictions on the medical use [of marijuana] as to prevent such use altogether 
. . .. It may serve to deprive the public of the benefits of a drug that on further 
research may prove to be of substantial benefit. 
Id. 
18. The International Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a treaty signed 
by members of the United Nations establishing several classifications, or schedules, of 
substances. Parties to the Single Convention are required to limit production, distribu­
tion, and possession of classified drugs to authorized medical and scientific purposes; to 
license and control all persons engaged in the manufacture or distribution of the drugs; 
and to prepare detailed estimates of national drug requirements. See Nat'! Org. for the 
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) V. Drug Enforcement Admin. (DEA), 559 F.2d 
735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
19. See generally 21 U.S.c. § 801 (Congressional Findings) (2000); ROBERT L. 
BOGOMOLNY ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG Acr: SHIFTING THE 
PERSPEcrIVE 5, 63-65 (1975). 
20. 21 U.S.c. §§ 811, 812 (2000). 
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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if and when it became necessary due to new findings or changing 
circumstances.22 
The CSA partitioned psychoactive drugs into five schedules ac­
cording to their abuse potential, known effect, harmfulness to an 
individual and to society at large, and level of accepted medical 
use.23 Schedule I drugs, which include substances such as heroin, 
LSD, and marijuana, are defined as drugs with "a high potential for 
abuse,24 . . . no currently-accepted medical use in the United 
States[, and] a lack of accepted safety for use of the substance 
under medical supervision."25 Physicians cannot prescribe drugs 
placed into Schedule J.26 
Schedule II drugs, like Schedule I drugs, are defined as having 
a high potential for abuse.27 However, unlike Schedule I drugs, 
these drugs have a currently accepted medical use and, therefore, 
are available to patients through a physician's prescription.28 
Schedule II drugs include morphine, cocaine, amphetamines, and 
PCP.29 The remaining schedules, Schedules III, IV, and V, relax 
the restrictions on the included drugs based on known dangers asso­
ciated with their use and the medical and/or societal value of the 
respective substances.3o 
Evidence suggests that Congress intended to place marijuana 
in Schedule I only temporarily, anticipating a possible change in 
marijuana's Schedule I status after studies yielded more concrete 
facts regarding marijuana's characteristics and effects.31 Accord­
ingly, when the CSA was enacted, Congress deferred its full consid­
eration of the medical use of marijuana pending the outcome of 
studies commissioned by the Presidential Commission on Mari­
juana and Drug Use.32 In 1972, the Commission's findings noted 
22. 21 U.S.C § 812 (2000) (establishing procedures for the rescheduling of 
substances). 
23. Id. § 812(b)(1) (listing findings required for Schedule I substances). 
24. 21 CF.R. § 1308.11 (2002) (listing current Schedule I drugs). 
25. 21 U.S.C § 812(b). 
26. Id.; see also id. § 829 (1997) (specifying how drugs in Schedules II-V may be 
dispensed and prescribed for medical use). 
27. Id. § 812(b)(2). 
28. !d. § 829(a) (making Schedule II drugs available through a written, non-refill­
able prescription). 
29. 21 CF.R. § 1308.12. 
30. 21 U.S.C § 812(b)(3)-(b)(5); 21 CF.R. § 1308.12-1308.15 (identifying the va­
rious categories and bases for classification). 
31. RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, II, THE MARIJUANA CON· 
VIcrION 246-47 (photo. reprint 1988) (1974). 
32. See id. at 247. The Committee Report on the House Bill regarding reschedul­
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marijuana lacked dangerousness and recommended dramatic re­
ductions in the legal penalties associated with it.33 
2. Efforts to Reschedule Marijuana 
One of the CSA's goals was to establish flexible drug schedules 
that could be modified when the circumstances so dictated.34 In­
deed, Congress included specific statutory criteria in the CSA's text 
to govern the rescheduling process when it became necessary.35 
CSA gave the authority to examine substances and reschedule them 
to the Attorney General, who, prior to any determination, was re­
quired to seek medical and scientific evaluations from the Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW").36 The Secretary of 
HEW, in turn, was required to make a recommendation regarding 
the proper scheduling of the particular drug.37 The Attorney Gen­
eral delegated his authority to examine and reschedule all drugs to 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ("BNDD"), the 
predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA").38 
In 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of Mari­
juana Laws ("NORML")39 and other groups40 filed a petition re­
questing the rescheduling of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule 
ing recommended" 'that marijuana be retained in Schedule I at least until the comple­
tion of studies now underway.' ... The recommendations of this Commission will be of 
aid in determining the appropriate disposition of this question in the future." H.R. 
REP. No. 91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573, 4579 (quoting letter from 
Roger O. Egeberg, M.D. to Hon. Harley O. Staggers (Aug. 14, 1970), in H.R. REP. No. 
91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573, 4629), quoted in BONNIE & WHITE. 
BREAD, supra note 31, at 247. Raymond Shafer, a former Republican Governor of 
Pennsylvania was selected by President Nixon to head the Commission. BONNIE & 
WHITEBREAD, supra note 31, at 256. 
33. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 31, at 270-73 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON 
MARIJUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL FOR MISUNDERSTANDING 145­
54 (1972), available at http://www.druglibrary.orglschafferllibrary/studies/nc/ncmenu. 
htm). The Report noted that marijuana was demonized because it symbolized the 
"counterculture," not because it had any negative physiological effects. 
34. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 13, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573,4579. 
35. [d.; 21 U.S.C § 811(c) (2000). 
36. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 13, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573, 4579; 21 
U.S.C § 811(a)-(b). 
37. 21 U.S.C § 811(b). 
38. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100-0.104 (2000) (outlining regulatory functions of the DEA). 
The BNDD became the DEA in 1973. 
39. Since its founding in 1970, NORML has provided "a voice in the public policy 
debate for those Americans who oppose marijuana prohibition and favor an end to the 
practice of arresting marijuana smokers. A non-profit public-interest advocacy group, 
NORML represents the interests of the tens of millions of Americans who smoke mari­
juana responsibly." NORML, ABOUT NORML, at http://www.norml.orglindex.cfm? 
Group_ID=3379 (last updated Apr. 15, 2003). 
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V.41 NORML's petition was denied by the BNDD on grounds that 
the Single Convention barred the rescheduling,42 and the petition­
ers appealed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia held that BNDD's decision was inconsis­
tent with the administrative process required by the CSA for 
rescheduling, which called for a finding on the merits.43 On re­
mand, in 1975, Administrative Law Judge Lewis Parker declared 
that the Single Convention did allow for the rescheduling of mari­
juana and suggested that the proper course of action was to hold 
rescheduling hearings as called for in the CSA.44 The DEA's acting 
Administrator, however, ignored AU Parker's suggestion and en­
tered a final order denying the petition "in all respects. "45 After 
the petitioners again appealed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
remanded, directing the DEA to refer the petition to the Secretary 
of HEW for an independent scientific evaluation and to comply 
with the requirements of the CSA.46 In 1979, the Secretary of 
HEW recommended that marijuana remain in Schedule I, and the 
DEA issued a final order denying the rescheduling petition without 
holding hearings on the matter.47 
For a third time, the petitioners appealed, and the case was 
again remanded to the DEA for a full reconsideration of the issues. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the DEA to carry out a 
full scientific evaluation and rescheduling recommendation. As a 
result, rescheduling hearings were held in 1986 before Administra­
tive Law Judge Francis Young. The issues before AU Young were 
whether the marijuana plant had a currently accepted medical use 
for treatment in the United States and whether there was an ac­
40. See supra note 3 (identifying groups organized for the purpose of providing 
medical marijuana to qualified persons). 
41. NORML v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NORML v. DEA, 559 
F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
42. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 750-57 (articulating the reason why reschedul­
ing was barred by the Single Convention). 
43. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d at 659-60. 
44. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 742. AU Parker found that the Single Conven­
tion allowed for the rescheduling of cannabis or cannabis resin to CSA Schedule II and 
cannabis leaves to Schedule V. Id. 
45. Marihuana Scheduling, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,164, 44,168 (Sept. 25, 1975) 
(determination). 
46. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 757. See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812 (2000) for 
CSA requirements (requiring the DEA to seek medical and scientific evaluations from 
the Secretary of HEW, who then makes a recommendation to the DEA as to the 
proper scheduling of the drug evaluated). 
47. Marihuana and Synthetic THC, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,123 (June 20, 1979) (final 
administrative order) . 
.,;" . .-,. . . 
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cepted safety for the use of the marijuana plant under medical su­
pervision.48 Based on the evidence presented, ALl Young found 
that marijuana had accepted medical uses49 and that there existed 
safety for marijuana use under medical supervision.50 Though ALl 
Young recommended that the DEA reschedule marijuana as a 
schedule II drug,51 the DEA disagreed with ALl Young's interpre­
tation of the phrase "currently accepted medical use," arguing that 
such accepted use required more than a minority of professionals 
and scholars.52 The DEA then applied a self-developed eight-fac­
tor test53 to determine whether a substance had a "current accepted 
medical value," and found that marijuana did not meet the 
criteria.54 
For a fourth time, the petitioners appealed and, once again, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case. In so doing, the 
court found that the eight-factor test developed by the DEA, 
though "in the main acceptable," contained several factors impossi­
ble to comply with.55 For example, one of the factors required gen­
48. In re Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22 (Sept. 6, 1988) (Opinion 
and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision of 
A.L.I. Francis L. Young), available at http://www.druglibrary.orgiolsenIMEDICALI 
YoungIY oung1.h tm!. 
49. Id. at 68. AU Young found that marijuana had accepted medical uses in the 
treatment of multiple sclerosis, spasticity, and hyperarathyroidism. Id. at 40-55. Addi­
tionally, regarding marijuana's use to treat cancer, AU Young held: 
[I]t is clear beyond any question that many people find marijuana to have, in 
the words of the [CSA], an "accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States" in affecting relief for cancer patients. Oncologists, physicians treating 
cancer patients accept this. Other medical practitioners and researchers ac­
cept this. Medical faculty professors accept this. Nurses performing hands-on 
patient care accept it. Patients accept it. 
Id. at 26. 
50. Id. at 66. 
51. Id. at 66-68. 
52. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
53. /d. (stating the eight factors used by the DEA: (1) scientifically determined 
and accepted knowledge of its chemistry; (2) toxicology and pharmacology of the sub­
stance in animals; (3)establishment of its effectiveness in humans through scientifically­
designed clinical trials; (4) general availability of the substance and information regard­
ing the substance and its use; (5) recognition of its clinical use in generally accepted 
pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals, or textbooks; (6) specific indications for 
the treatment of recognized disorders; (7) recognition of the use of the substance by 
organizations or associations of physicians; and (8) recognition and use of the substance 
by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United States). 
54. Schedules of Controlled Substances, 53 Fed. Reg. 5156 (Feb. 22, 1998) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308). 
55. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d at 937, 941. 
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eral use and acceptance of a substance before the substance could 
be found to have an accepted medical value, even though Schedule 
I expressly prevented such use.56 The DEA subsequently elimi­
nated its eight-factor test and replaced it with a new five-factor 
test,57 again of its own fabrication. Based on this new test, the 
DEA issued a final order denying the rescheduling petition.58 
The petitioners appealed a fifth time, objecting to inappropri­
ate evidentiary standards and alleging bias by the DEA.59 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found 
that the petitioners were not prejudiced by the evidentiary stan­
dards and that the DEA's findings were supported by "substantial 
evidence."6o Accordingly, the petition for review was denied and 
the rescheduling effort came to a close, twenty-two years after it 
was initially filed.61 
Despite NORML and the other petitioners' unsuccessful at­
tempts at rescheduling marijuana, the continued demand for medi­
cal marijuana by patients and physicians throughout the United 
States persuaded the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in 
1976 to approve the medicinal use of marijuana on a restricted ba­
SiS.62 This was accomplished through the implementation of the In­
dividual Treatment Investigational New Drug Program (or 
Compassionate Use IND Program) ["IND Program"],63 under 
which physicians could obtain special authority to administer mari­
juana to patients.64 Although the IND Program at its peak enrolled 
56. Id. 
57. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (stating the five factors used by the DEA to determine the meaning of "currently 
accepted medical use: (1) [t]he drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible; (2) 
[t]here must be adequate safety studies; (3) [t]here must be adequate and well-con­
trolled studies proving efficacy; (4) [t]he drug must be accepted by qualified experts; 
and (5) [t]he scientific evidence must be widely available." (quoting Notice of Denial of 
Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499, 10,506 (Mar. 26, 1992». 
58. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 10,506. 
59. The petitioners pointed to the long history of DEA anti-marijuana prejudice, 
as evidenced by the court's need to remand on four prior occasions and the DEA Ad­
ministrator's refusal to follow previous recommendations for the rescheduling of mari­
juana, as well as comments by the Administrator minimizing the value of statements by 
persons claiming to benefit from marijuana use. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 15 
F.3d at 1136-37. 
60. Id. at 1137 (stating that the Administrator had supplied expert testimony that 
"marijuana's medicinal value has never been proven in sound scientific studies"). 
61. Id. at 1133. 
62. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 20-21. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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as many as seventy-eight patients nationwide, it was closed to all 
new applicants in 1992, in an effort to prevent it from being overrun 
with AIDS patients requesting access to medical marijuana sup­
plies.65 Today the IND Program remains in operation for only 
seven surviving, previously-approved patients.66 
II. UNITED STATES v. OAKLAND CANNABIS 
BUYERS' COOPERATIVE67 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
When California voters enacted Prop 215 in November of 
1996, the purpose of the initiative measure was to ensure that seri­
ously ill Californians had the right to obtain and use marijuana for 
medical purposes.68 Prop 215 created an exception to California 
65. ALLIANCE FOR CANNABIS THERAPEUTICS, MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE FAQ, 
at http://www.marijuana·as·medicine.orglAlliance/faq.htm [hereinafter MARIJUANA AS 
MEDICINE FAQ] 
The Compassionate IND Program was closed because too many people were 
asking for access to medical marijuana supplies. In order for marijuana to be 
classified as a prohibited schedule I drug, it must not have "accepted medical 
use in treatment" in the United States. The federal government knew that 
hundreds (or thousands) of approved Compassionate IND recipients would 
quickly undermine that criteria and marijuana would have to be rescheduled. 
Rather than face this possibility, the federal government closed the Compas­
sionate IND Program for marijuana. 
Id.; see also Coalition for Compassionate Access Web site, at http://www.compassionate 
access.orglbackground.html. 
66. MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE FAQ, supra note 65. 
67. 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
68. Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, states as its purpose: 
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use 
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate 
and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the per­
son's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of can­
cer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or 
any other illness for which marijuana provides relief. 
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use 
marijuana for medical purposes upon a recommendation of a physician are not 
subject to criminal prosecution or sanction. 
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to 
provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in 
medical need of marijuana. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibit­
ing persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone 
the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, no physician in this state 
shall be punished or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended 
marijuana to a patient for medical purposes. 
(d) Section 11357 [of the California Code], relating to the possession of mari­
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laws that prohibited the cultivation and possession of marijuana.69 
This exception allowed patients and their primary caregivers, with a 
doctor's prescription, to possess or cultivate marijuana for the pur­
pose of treating the patients' medical maladies. Such individuals 
were to be exempt from the prohibitions on the use and cultivation 
of marijuana imposed upon the population at large. 
After Prop 215 was enacted into law, several groups organized 
dispensaries of medical cannabis to meet the needs of qualified pa­
tients.7° In January 1998, the United States sued one of these 
groups, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("Coopera­
tive"), a not-for-profit dispensary of marijuana. The United States 
brought suit seeking to "enjoin the Cooperative from distributing 
and manufacturing marijuana ... [because] whether or not the Co­
operative's activities are legal under California law, they violate 
federal law ... [s]pecifically ... the [CSA]."71 The district court 
judge, Charles R. Breyer,72 granted a preliminary injunction.73 The 
Cooperative did not appeal the injunction and openly violated it by 
continuing to distribute marijuana.74 To end the Cooperative's con­
tinuing violation of the injunction, the United States initiated con­
tempt proceedings.75 The Cooperative claimed that its distribution 
of marijuana was medically necessary because marijuana was the 
only drug that could alleviate the severe pain and other debilitating 
symptoms of its patients and motioned for a dismissal or a medical 
necessity modification to the injunction.76 
juana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not 
apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or culti­
vates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the 
written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician. 
CAL. HEALTII & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2(02). 
69. § 13362.5(d). 
70. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998). 
71. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 487. 
72. Charles R. Breyer is Supreme Court Justice Breyer's brother. For this reason, 
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration and decision of aCBC when it was 
before the Supreme Court. Id. at 485. 
73. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. The district 
court granted the government's request for an injunction that prohibited possession of 
marijuana with the intent to manufacture or distribute in addition to the distribution 
and manufacturing of marijuana. The Supreme Court, for simplicity, referred to both 
activities collectively as distributing and manufacturing marijuana. See aCBC, 532 U.S. 
at 487, n.1. 
74. aCBe, 532 U.S. at 487. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 488. 
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Judge Breyer denied the Cooperative's motion to dismiss, de­
nied the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction, and found 
the Cooperative in contempt.77 Judge Breyer, in rejecting the mo­
tion to dismiss and the medical necessity defense, reiterated the 
standard necessary to assert the common law defense of necessity 
established in United States v. Aguilar:78 
[Defendant must prove] (1) that he was faced with a choice of 
evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent immi­
nent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a direct causal rela­
tionship between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) 
that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law,?9 
The district court determined that there was insufficient evi­
dence to show that each recipient of marijuana was in actual danger 
of imminent harm without the drug80 and modified the preliminary 
injunction to empower the U.S. Marshall to seize the Cooperative's 
premises.81 Although recognizing that "human suffering" could re­
sult, the district court concluded that a court's "equitable powers 
[do] not permit it to ignore federal law."82 Three days later, the 
district court also rejected a motion by the Cooperative to modify 
the injunction to permit distributions that were medically 
necessary.83 
The Cooperative appealed the contempt order and the denial 
of its motion to modify, but before the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals decided the case, the Cooperative voluntarily purged its con­
tempt by promising compliance with the initial preliminary 
injunction, thereby rendering the appeal of the contempt order 
moot.84 However, the denial of its motion to modify the injunction 
remained an open issue, and the Ninth Circuit, holding 3-0 that the 
medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense, re­
versed and remanded with instructions to consider criteria for a 
medical necessity exception to the CSA's prohibitions.85 
77. Id. 
78. 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989). 
79. Id. 
80. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. 
81. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 487. 
82. /d. at 488. 
83. Id. 
84. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1112-13 
(9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
85. /d. at 1114-15 (stating that because the district court had erroneously "be­
lieved that it had no discretion to issue an injunction that was more limited in scope 
than the Controlled Substances Act itself, it summarily denied the requested modifica­
2003]MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE 159 

Accordingly, on July 17, 2000, the district court granted the Co­
operative's motion to modify the injunction to incorporate the med­
ical necessity defense.86 Thereafter, the United States filed a 
petition for certiorari,87 which was granted by the Supreme Court 
"because the decision raises significant questions as to the ability of 
the United States to enforce the Nation's drug laws."88 
B. Holding and Reasoning of the Supreme Court 
In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken­
nedy joined, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and held that the medical necessity defense "is not a 
defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "89 Justice 
Stevens filed a concurring opinion90 in which Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg joined. 
The Supreme Court stated that the CSA allowed an exception 
to the prohibition on intentionally manufacturing, distributing, or 
tion [to the injunction] without weighing or considering the public interest"). The 
Ninth Circuit also stated that because district courts retain "broad equitable discretion" 
to fashion injunctive relief, the district court could have, and should have, weighed the 
public interest and considered factors such as the serious harm in depriving patients of 
marijuana. Id. at 1114. 
86. 	 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 2000 WL 1517166 (N.D. 
Cal.). 	 The district court modified the May 19, 1998, injunction as follows: 
The foregoing injunction does not apply to the distribution of cannabis by 
[OCBC] to patient-members who (1) suffer from a serious medical condition, 
(2) will suffer imminent harm if the patient-member does not have access to 
cannabis, (3) need cannabis for the treatment of the patient-member's medical 
condition, or need cannabis to alleviate the medical condition or symptoms 
associated with the medical condition, and (4) have no reasonable legal alter­
native to cannabis for the effective treatment or alleviation of the patient­
member's legal medical condition or symptoms associated with the medical 
condition because the patient-member has tried all other legal alternatives to 
cannabis and the alternatives have been ineffective in treating or alleviating 
the patient-member's medical condition or symptoms associated with the med­
ical condition, or the alternatives result in side effects which the patient-mem­
ber cannot reasonably tolerate. 
Id. at *1. 
87. Note that it was the George W. Bush Administration that appealed the case 
to the Supreme Court, an action contrary to President Bush's public support for states' 
rights in the area of medical marijuana. "I believe each state can choose that decision 
as they so choose." Susan Feeny, Bush Backs States' Rights on Marijuana: He Opposes 
Medical Use But Favors Local Control, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 1999 (quot­
ing President George W. Bush). 
88. 	 OCBC, 532 U.S. at 489. 
89. 	 Id. at 494. 
90. 	 See infra Part II.C. (discussing the concurrence). 
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dispensing a Schedule I controlled substance only for 
"[g]overnment-approved research projects."91 The Court rejected 
the Cooperative's assertion that 21 U.S.C. § 841{a)92 of the CSA is 
subject to "additional, implied exceptions"93 which should be read 
into the CSA,94 one of which, the Cooperative claimed, is the com­
mon law defense of necessity.95 
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court noted that "it is an 
open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recog­
nize a necessity defense not provided by statute."96 However, the 
Court stated that, in this case, it did not need to decide that particu­
lar question and that it needed only to recognize that the terms of 
the CSA were specifically inconsistent with any medical exception 
for marijuana.97 The Court further stated that, regarding the neces­
sity defense, "one principle is clear: The defense cannot succeed 
when the legislature itself has made a 'determination of values> "98 
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred when it 
recognized the medical necessity defense as a "legally cognizable 
91. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490 ("providing procedures for becoming a government-
approved research project" (citing 21 U.S.c. § 823(f))). 
92. 21 U.S.c. § 841(a) (2000) states: 
(a) Unlawful acts 
Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful for any person know­
ingly or intentionally­
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to man­
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or 
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or 
dispense, a counterfeit substance. 
93. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490. 
94. Id. 
95. Although the defense was not before the Supreme Court and Justice Thomas 
overlooked it in his statement that the CSA contains no exceptions except for research, 
the fact is that § 885 of the CSA creates a broad exception for state or local officials 
engaged in activities relating to controlled substances as properly authorized by state or 
municipal law. See 21 U.S.c. § 885( d) (stating "no civil or criminal liability shall be 
imposed by virtue of this title upon any duly authorized ... officer of any State, terri­
tory, [or] political subdivision thereof ... who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforce­
ment of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances"). The issue 
then arises of what would result following the passage by a state of a law authorizing 
state agencies or individuals to produce and distribute medical marijuana, or state doc­
tors to prescribe and furnish it. Technically in these circumstances, such state agencies 
or individuals would be immune from federal prosecution for CSA violations as per 
§ 885. 
96. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490. 
97. Id. at 491. 
98. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW 629 (2d ed. 1986)). 
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defense"99 and when it remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to consider "the criteria for a medical necessity exemp­
tion."loo The Supreme Court also found that, although district 
courts have discretion in fashioning injunctive relief, the Court of 
Appeals erred in stating the factors that district courts may consider 
when exercising this discretion.lOl The Supreme Court warned that 
the exercise of discretion by the district courts does not include 
"ignor[ing] the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in leg­
islation,"102 and that Congress had expressed precisely such deliber­
ate judgment in the CSA.103 
C. The "Dissenting Concurrence" 
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter and Ginsburg 
joined, issued a concurring opinion that, in many ways, read like a 
dissent. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion be­
cause he agreed that a distributor of marijuana does not have a 
medical necessity defense under the CSA. Justice Stevens did not 
join in the majority'S dicta, however, which extended the holding 
beyond manufacturing and distribution to possession and use.104 
99. Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 
F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
100. Id. (quoting DCBC, 190 F.3d at 1115). 
101. Id. at 498-99. 
[T]he Court of Appeals erred by considering relevant the evidence that some 
people have "serious medical conditions for whom the use of cannabis is nec­
essary in order to treat or alleviate those conditions or their symptoms," that 
these people "will suffer serious harm if they are denied cannabis," and that 
"there is no legal alternative to cannabis for the effective treatment of their 
medical conditions." 
Id. (quoting DCBC, 190 F.3d at 1115). 
102. DCBC, 532 U.S. at 497 (citing Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 
U.S. 515, 551 (1937)). 
103. !d. at 1722 (stating that "in the [CSA], the balance already has been struck 
against a medical necessity exception."). See also id. at 491: 
In the case of the [CSA], the statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no 
medical benefits worthy of an exception ... Whereas some other drugs can be dis­
pensed and prescribed for medical use ... the same is not true for marijuana. Indeed, 
for purposes of the [CSA], marijuana has 'no currently accepted medical use' at all. 
104. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated: 

This confined holding is consistent with our grant of certiorari, which was lim­

ited to the question '[w]hether the [CSA] forecloses a medical necessity de­





Accordingly ... respondents have raised the medical necessity defense as 
a justification for distributing marijuana ... and it was in that context that the 
Ninth Circuit determined that respondents had 'a legally cognizable defense.' 
... [This] court is surely correct to reverse that determination.... 
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Justice Stevens characterized the majority's dicta in this respect as 
"unwarranted and unfortunate excursions" from the case's "limited 
holding."lo5 Specifically, Justice Stevens disagreed with the major­
ity opinion in three ways. 
First, Justice Stevens found it inappropriate for the Court in 
this case to decide "whether the [medical necessity] defense might 
be available to a seriously ill patient for whom there is no alterna­
tive means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering."106 
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority should, instead, have lim­
ited its finding to the facts and issue of the case, that is, to the 
CSA's applicability to a defendant charged with manufacturing and 
distributing marijuana.107 
Second, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's casting 
doubt upon the availability of the necessity defense in cases of less­
than-explicit statutory authority. In response to the majority's 
statement that "it is an open question whether federal courts ever 
have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by 
statute,"108 Justice Stevens stated that "our precedent has expressed 
no doubt about the viability of the common-law defense [of neces­
sity], even in the context of federal criminal statutes that do not 
provide for it in so many words. "109 
Third, Justice Stevens expressed disagreement with the way the 
Apart from its holding, [this] Court takes two unwarranted and unfortu­
nate excursions that prevent me from joining in [the majority] opinion. First, 
the court reaches beyond its holding, and beyond the facts of the case, by 
suggesting that the defense of necessity is unavailable for anyone under the 
[CSA].... 
Second, t[his] court gratuitously casts doubt on 'whether necessity can 
ever be a defense' to any federal statute that does not explicitly provide for it. 
Id. at 499-50l. 
105. Id. at 500. 
106. Id. at SOL 
107. Id. at 500; see also Leah M. Perkins, Supreme Court Upholds Congressional 
Classification of Cannabis, 3 No. 13 LAWYERS J. 1 (2001). 
108. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490. 
109. Id. at 501. As authority for his statement, Justice Stevens quoted United 
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,415(1980): 
We therefore hold that, where a criminal defendant is charged with escape and 
claims that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, 
he must proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to cus­
tody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force. 
He then stated, "Our principal difference with the dissent, therefore, is not as to the 
existence of such a defense, but as to the importance of surrender as an element of it." 
aCBC, 532 U.S. at 501. 
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majority's dicta interfered with Prop 215. He stated, regarding the 
imposition of federal law contrary to state law, that: 
[R]espect for the sovereign states ... imposes a duty on federal 
courts to, whenever possible, avoid or minimize conflict between 
federal and state law, particularly in situations in which the citi­
zens of a State have chosen to "serve as a laboratory" in the trial 
of "novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country. "110 
Underscoring the limited nature of the holding and his disa­
greement with the majority's dicta, Justice Stevens ended his opin­
ion with the warning that aeBe should have left two questions 
open: "[w]hether it would be an abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to refuse to enjoin ... violations" of the CSA by a seriously 
ill patient for whom marijuana may be a necessity, and "whether 
the District Court may consider the availability of the necessity de­
fense for that sort of violator."l11 
III. GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF A NECESSITY DEFENSE 
The Supreme Court's holding in aeBe is narrow and limited: 
"medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distribut­
ing marijuana."112 Beyond this limited holding, the majority as­
serted in its dicta that "nothing in our analysis, or the statute, 
suggests that a distinction should be drawn between the prohibi­
tions on manufacturing and distributing and the other prohibitions 
in the Controlled Substances Act. "113 Justice Stevens disagreed 
with this broad construction and began the concurring opinion with 
a reminder of the "Court's narrow holding" so that it would not "be 
lost in its broad dicta. "114 
The concurrence disagreed with the majority on three particu­
lar points:115 (1) whether, as the majority suggests, the defense of 
110. DCBC, 532 U.S. at 502 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting». 
111. Id. at 503 .. Justice Stevens indicated that these questions should be decided 
when the facts of a future case so warrant, on the authority of cases such as Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
112. DCBC, 532 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). 
113. Id. at 499 n.7. The Court was referring to other CSA prohibitions, one of 
which is the use and possession of marijuana. Justice Stevens characterized the major­
ity's statement in footnote seven of the majority opinion as "perhaps the most glaring 
example of the Court's dicta." Id. at 501 n.2 (referring to the manner in which the 
majority's dicta extended beyond the facts and issue of the case). 
114. Id. at 499. 
115. Id. at 501-03. 
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necessity is unavailable not just to manufacturers and distributors, 
but also to users and possessors under the CSA; (2) whether the 
defense of necessity is, or can be, available as a defense to a federal 
statute in instances where the statute does not explicitly or deliber­
ately bar it; and (3) whether it would be an abuse of discretion for a 
district court to refuse to enjoin certain violations of the CSA, such 
as the use and possession of marijuana by a seriously ill patient for 
whom the drug may be a necessity.116 
This Note proposes that a person charged with use or posses­
sion of marijuana for medical purposes in violation of the CSA 
should be allowed by the courts to use the defense of medical ne­
cessity. This claim rests on the analysis of three legal issues ex­
amined in this section. The first part of this section examines the 
traditional availability of the defense of necessity, specifically, 
whether the common law "choice of evils" defense justifies the al­
lowance of the necessity defense where physical forces beyond the 
defendant's control and lack of legal alternatives to breaking the 
law threaten irreparable injury to the defendant. The second part 
examines the historical function and scope of the doctrine of judi­
cial equitable discretion, specifically, whether it would be an abuse 
of equitable discretion for a district court to refuse to enjoin use 
and possession of marijuana violations of the CSA, when such use 
and possession is related to serious medical need. The third part 
examines principles of federalism, as they relate to the duty im­
posed upon federal courts to minimize or avoid conflict between 
state and federal law, particularly in cases where the citizens of a 
state have directly enacted laws that are in conflict with federal law. 
Specifically, the third part of the analysis focuses on whether princi­
ples of federalism require federal courts to resolve the conflict be­
tween the CSA and Prop 215 on the side of Prop 215 because it 
represents a situation where the citizens of California have enacted 
a law that conflicts with the federal CSA. Additionally, since the 
topic of pain relief is inherently tied to the use of marijuana for 
medical purposes, the history and scope of the right to pain relief is 
discussed generally in each of the Subsections. 
A. The Defense of Necessity 
While there seems to be no exact, comprehensive definition of 
116. Id. 
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what constitutes a defense of necessity,117 the actual concept has 
been "anciently woven into the fabric of our culture."118 History is 
filled with situations where the defense has been raised, and a gen­
eral understanding of its meaning can be drawn from these con­
texts. 119 Some scholars suggest that a defense of necessity 
recognizes that one may violate the law to avoid a greater evil.120 
Whatever its origin, the rationale for the necessity defense is 
that society is sometimes willing to excuse, or even justify, what 
would otherwise be illegal conduct, if done to avoid an even worse 
or greater evil.121 
The pressure of natural physical forces sometimes confronts a 
person in an emergency with a choice of two evils: either he may 
violate the literal terms of the criminal law and thus produce a 
harmful result, or he may comply with those terms and thus pro­
duce a greater or equal or lesser amount of harm. For reasons of 
social policy, if the harm which will result from compliance with 
the law is greater than that which will result from violation of it, 
[the defendant] is [by virtue of the defense of necessity] justified 
in violating it.122 
While the act of breaking the law itself is voluntary in the sense 
that the actor consciously decides to do it, the decision is dictated 
by the absence of an acceptable alternative.123 The act is therefore 
excused or justified even though it constitutes otherwise unlawful 
conduct. 
English and American courts have long recognized the defense 
of necessity.124 In addition, about half of the states have codified it 
into statutes and all of them have historically recognized it as a 
common law defense.125 Similarly, the Model Penal Code ("MPC") 
117. See GEORGE E. DIX & MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 718-32 (3d ed. 
1987) (discussing necessity, duress, and justification defenses). 
118. Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in 
Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 
289,291 (1974) (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d 
ed.1960». 
119. Id. at 291-96; see note 133 infra for a list of such cases. 
120. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 441 (2d ed. 1986). 
121. Id. at 385. 
122. Id. 
123. Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 716 
n.114 (2000) (citing United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2251 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. 1976». 
124. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 118, at 291-96. 
125. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (Michie 1993) (recognizing necessity as 
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defines the necessity defense as a choice of evils where: 1) the 
threatened injury would be worse than the legal violation, 2) the 
law does not provide exceptions or defenses in the particular situa­
tion, 3) there is no legislation that specifically forbids the necessity 
defense, and 4) the actor has not negligently or recklessly caused 
the situation which necessitated the breaking of the law.126 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Bailey127 stated that the 
"defense of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally [encompassed] 
the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control ren­
dered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils."128 The Court in Bai­
ley also reiterated that "if there was a reasonable, legal alternative 
to violating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act 
and also to avoid the threatened harm,' the defense of necessity 
would fail."129 With the lack of a federal statute codifying the de­
fense of necessity, Bailey remains an important articulation of the 
law by the Supreme Court because it established the Court's recog­
nition of the availability of the defense of necessity in federal 
courtS.130 The defense of necessity has been used in a variety of 
situations, such as justifying property damage and trespass or in 
other circumstances,131 including cases within a medical context.132 
a defense in "choice of evils statute"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702(1) (West 
1999) (recognizing necessity as a defense in emergency situations to avoid imminent 
public or private injury); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (2001) (recognizing the neces­
sity defense in a "choice of evils statute"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302 (1999) (recogniz­
ing the necessity defense in a "choice of evils statute"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 
(Michie 1999) (recognizing the necessity defense in a "choice of evils statute"); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1997) (recognizing necessity as a defense in emergency 
situations to avoid imminent public or private injury). 
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). 
127. 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). 
128. [d. 
129. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 379 (1972». 
130. Id. at 410-11. 
131. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 475 
(1994); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 comments, at 9-14 
(ALI 1985) (discussing typical necessity defense cases); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 
120, at 444 (discussing typical necessity defense applications). 
132. See, e.g., State v. Bachman, 595 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1979) (defendant suffered 
from glaucoma); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991); State v. 
Cole, 874 P.2d 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant had history of back pain); State v. 
Diana, 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)(defendant suffered from multiple 
sclerosis) . 
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1. 	 The Medical Necessity Defense in Marijuana Cases: The 
Lesser of Two Evils 
The defense of medical necessity is often raised in situations 
where the use of drugs to alleviate pain or other effects of terminal 
illnesses has resulted in violation of drug laws. l33 While judicial de­
cisions indicate mixed results in the acceptance of the medical ne­
cessity defense for marijuana use or possession, the basis for the 
rationale of the courts that have allowed the use of the defense has 
hinged on the core concept of the necessity defense-a choice be­
tween conflicting evils. l34 The medical necessity defense should be 
available as a relevant excuse or justification for violations of CSA 
provisions dealing with use and/or possession of marijuana, on the 
ground that medical need renders the violation of the CSA the 
lesser of two evils. 
Prior to DCBC, the defense of necessity had been raised in 
courts throughout the nation by persons claiming a medical need 
for the drug. For example, in State v. Hanson,135 the defendant 
smoked marijuana to combat the effects of epilepsy medication. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals disallowed the medical necessity 
defense because it found that the defense ran counter to the Minne­
sota legislature's decision to classify marijuana as a schedule I sub­
stance. l36 Similarly, in State v. Tate l37 the defendant smoked 
marijuana to provide relief from his quadriplegic condition. l38 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the medical necessity defense 
on the ground that the legislature of New Jersey had not given the 
133. See, e.g., Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (defendants 
had AIDS); Diana, 604 P.2d at 1312. 
134. In Randall and Diana, the courts weighed the patient's interests versus the 
government's interests before allowing the defense of medical necessity, and in Jenks, 
the court allowed the defense of medical necessity after it discussed the medical neces­
sity defense elements and the choice of evils concept. See LeVay, supra note 124, at 716 
n.114 (citing United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.e. Super. Ct. 
1976»; Diana, 604 P.2d at 1315-16; Jenks, 582 So. 2d at 678-79. 
135. 468 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
136. Id. at 78-79. See also MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01(7) & 152.02(1) (1990) (attach­
ing criminal penalties to the possession, sale, or cultivation of mariJuana). 
137. 505 A.2d 941 (N.J. 1986). 
138. Quadriplegia is a condition resulting from a spinal chord injury near the 
neck, resulting in paralysis of the muscles in the body. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra 
note 9, at 82. Sometimes quadriplegia results in spasticity, the involuntary and abnor­
mal contraction of muscles. In such cases, marijuana can provide relief. See MARI­
JUANA, MEDICINE AND THE LAW: HEARING BEFORE THE U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION 425 (R.e. Randall ed. 1988) (citing and quoting INST. OF MEDICINE, 
MARIJUANA AND HEALTH 139 (National Academy Press ed., 1982» [hereinafter 
MEDICINE AND THE LAW]. 
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court discretion to accept the medical necessity defense.139 
Other courts have allowed the use of the medical necessity de­
fense in cases dealing with the medical use of marijuana.14o In 
United States v. Randall ,141 the defendant used marijuana to treat 
his glaucoma.142 The court balanced the defendant's interest in pre­
serving his sight against the government's interest in controlling the 
drug and concluded that the defendant's interest outweighed the 
government's. In arriving at its conclusion, the Randall court ap­
plied the reasoning of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma in Stowe v. United States. 143 The 
Stowe court had found that the patients' right to medical treatment 
outweighed the government's interest in protecting the general 
public. Based on this finding, the district court prohibited the FDA 
from preventing the patients' use of laetrile to treat their cancer. l44 
In State v. Diana,145 the defendant suffered from multiple scle­
rosis146 and claimed that his use of marijuana was supported by 
139. See Tate, 505 A.2d at 944-45. 
140. See, e.g., People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Cal. 1997); Sowell v. State, 
738 So.2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Bachman, 595 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1979); 
State v. Hastings, 801 P.2d 563 (Idaho 1990); State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. 
App.1979). 
141. LeVay, supra note 124, at 716 n.114 (citing United States v. Randall, 104 
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976». 
142. The defendant believed that marijuana neutralized the inner-ocular pressure 
and decreased the visual distortions caused by glaucoma. Id.; see also GRINSPOON & 
BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 40 (stating that glaucoma is the leading cause of blindness in 
the U.S. accounting for 10% of the onset of blindness in adults, and afflicting 1.5% of 
the population at age 50 and 5% at age 70). 
143. Civ. No. 75-0218-B (W.D. Okla. 1975). In Stowe, an unreported civil case, 
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the FDA from preventing their cancer-suffering spouses 
from receiving -laetrile, a drug banned by the FDA because it was not proven that it 
effectively treated cancer. This reasoning was later applied in Randall. The Randall 
court enjoined the FDA because "the patient's right to medical treatment with a sub­
stance which had demonstrably favorable effects on their cancers superseded any inter­
est of the government in protecting the general public from a drug whose properties 
were not conclusively proven." West Virginia v. Donna Jean Poling, No. 26568 (W. Va. 
May 10, 2000) (Starcher, J., dissenting), at http://www.state.wv.us/wvscaJdocs/springOO/ 
26568d.pdf (quoting U.S. v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2253 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. 1976». This right to medical treatment was the basis for the court enjoining the 
FDA from preventing the plaintiffs from importing laetrile for their own medical use. 
See also Keene v. United States, 81 F.R.D. 653 (S.D. w. Va. 1979). 
144. Stowe, Civ. No. 75-0128-B. 
145. 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 
146. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 66-68 ("Multiple sclerosis is a dis­
order in which patches of myelin (the protective covering of nerve fibers) in the brain 
and spinal chord are destroyed and the normal functioning of the nerve fibers them­
selves is interrupted."); see also MEDICINE AND THE LAW, supra note 138, at 362 (quot­
ing INST. OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND HEALTH 139 (National Academy Press ed., 
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medical research, that he needed marijuana because other drugs 
generated unpleasant side effects, and that he unsuccessfully at­
tempted to obtain marijuana legally through his doctor. The Wash­
ington Court of Appeals held that the medical necessity defense 
was justified in certain limited and specific circumstances, such as 
those present in that case.147 The court stated that, in cases where 
the medical use of marijuana is in question, "the court must balance 
the defendant's interest in preserving his health against the State's 
interest in regulating the drug involved. "148 
Similarly, in Jenks v. State149 the defendants used marijuana to 
obtain relief from problems derived from AIDS150 and claimed 
that, since they could not obtain relief from other alternatives,151 
the evil avoided was greater than the evil of violating the law.152 
The court held that the defendants had proved the three elements 
necessary for the medical necessity defense: 1) they had not in­
tended to contract AIDS; 2) their physicians supported their claim 
that no other drug effectively controlled their nausea; and 3) failure 
to control the effects of AIDS would put their lives in jeopardy.153 
Based on these facts, the court allowed the medical necessity 
defense.154 
The bases for the rationale of the courts that have allowed the 
use of the defense of necessity in marijuana cases has thus hinged 
1982)) (stating that a victim of multiple sclerosis claimed that five minutes after smok­
ing marijuana, she stopped vomiting and no longer felt nauseous and that there was a 
noticeable reduction in her spasms). 
147. Diana, 604 P.2d at 1314-15. 
148. Id. at 1317. 
149. 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The defendants, Kenneth and 
Barbara Jenks, smoked marijuana to control the nausea caused by some side effects of 
AIDS treatment medication. Id. at 677. Kenneth Jenks inherited hemophilia from his 
mother and contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion. Kenneth subsequently un­
knowingly passed it on to his wife Barbara. Id. 
150. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") is a deadly disease that 
attacks the immune system, making the individual susceptible to opportunistic infec­
tions. Many people claim that marijuana helps reduce some negative effects of AIDS 
treatment, such as nausea and the inability to keep food down. GRINSPOON & 
BAKALAR, supra note 9. 
151. Jenks, 582 So. 2d at 679-80. The Jenks' doctor, Dr. Thomas D. Sunnenberg, 
testified that "he had been unable to find any effective drug for treating the defendants' 
nausea," that the nausea was so debilitating that the defendants could die if it was not 
controlled, and that the only drug that controlled their nausea effectively was mari­
juana. Id. 
152. Id. at 678. 
153. Id. at 679-80; see also supra note 151 (discussing the Jenks' doctor's 
testimony). 
154. Id. 
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on the core concept of the necessity defense: the choice between 
conflicting "evils."155 On the one hand, there exist the interests of 
the government, and on the other, the interests of the medical mari­
juana user. These conflicting interests translate into conflicting 
evils for both parties: the government's societal interest in prevent­
ing drug use represents an "evil" to the patient in medical need of 
an illegal drug, whereas an individual's interest in using an illegal 
drug for medical reasons represents an "evil" to a government at­
tempting to reduce the harmful societal effects of drug use. 
The enactment and enforcement of the CSA represents Con­
gress' decision to restrict or nullify one individual's medical interest 
for the benefit of the greater societal interest. Presumably, Con­
gress has made the choice of the greater value, or, conversely, the 
choice of the lesser evil. Consequently, an individual must weigh 
his or her medical interests against the criminality of his or her ac­
tions. Thus, the breaking of the law represents the individual's 
choice of engaging in criminality for the benefit of his medical 
needs-in this case, the choice of greater value, or lesser evil, to the 
individual. 
Based on the above reasoning, the medical necessity defense 
should be available for violations of CSA provisions dealing with 
use or possession of marijuana on the ground that medical need 
renders the violation of the CSA the lesser of two evils. 
2. Conflicting Evils: Breaking the Law or Living in Pain 
The concept of a choice of evils in the medical marijuana con­
text boils down to a choice between 1) breaking the law in the 
course of using marijuana and, as a result, relieving pain or remedy­
ing some other medical malady or 2) not breaking the law and, as a 
result, living with the pain or the medical malady.156 
The Supreme Court's articulation in Bailey 157 that the defense 
of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation 
where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal 
155. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing cases where necessity 
defense has been used in medical context). 
156. Many of the cited cases illustrate how people use marijuana for a variety of 
medical reasons. While this Note focuses on the application of marijuana for pain relief 
as a source for its legal reasoning and a basis for its conclusions, it should be noted that 
the analysis involved is equally valid for uses of the drug beyond the relief of physical 
pain. 
157. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
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conduct the lesser of two evils158 hints at the validity of the medical 
defense of necessity in marijuana use cases. Many users claim that 
they smoke marijuana to control the pain derived from a variety of 
sources, or to avoid starvation resulting from an inability to keep 
food down without vomiting, or for other medical reasons,159 all 
"beyond the actor's control," which came upon them absent any 
fault of their own. On the basis of these physical forces beyond the 
actor's control, seriously ill persons should be allowed to use the 
defense of necessity in cases dealing with use or possession of mari­
juana for medical purposes.160 
In Bailey, the Supreme Court reiterated that if there were rea­
sonable, legal alternatives to violating the law, "a chance both to 
refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened 
harm," the defense of necessity would fail.161 Users of medical ma­
rijuana are typically faced with a bleak choice between the refusal 
to commit the criminal act of smoking marijuana, and consequent 
harm to themselves, or the avoidance of the harm by voluntarily 
committing the criminal act. 162 In some cases, courts have found 
that the possibility of rescheduling marijuana outside of schedule II 
(thUS allowing for its legal medical prescription) represents an ad­
ministrative alternative and, therefore, the Bailey standard of ex­
hausting all available potential remedies is not met.163 Other courts 
158. Id. at 410. 
159. See Marcia 1iersky, Comment, Medical Marijuana: Putting the Power Where 
it Belongs, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 547, 552-63 (1999). In the twentieth century, physicians 
have found marijuana to be an effective treatment for a range of ailments, including: 
nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy; weight loss associated with AIDS; 
glaucoma; epilepsy; muscle spasms and chronic pain in cases of multiple sclerosis; 
quadriplegia and other spastic disorders; migraines; severe pruritus; and depression and 
other mood disorders. Id. at 552-63; see also GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 
163-75 (stating that physicians have found marijuana useful in treating asthma, insom­
nia, dystonia, scleroderma, Crohn's Disease, and diabetic gastroparesis). 
160. See e.g., Jenks, 582 So. 2d at 679-80; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN § 5-2-604 
(Michie 1993) (recognizing the necessity defense in "choice of evil" statute); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702(1) (West 1990) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 
(1995) (same); HAW. REv. STAT. § 703-320 (1993) (same). 
161. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMI. 
NAL LAW § 28, at 379 (1972)). 
162. For example, a person who smokes marijuana to ameliorate her pain can 
either voluntarily choose not to break the law by ceasing to smoke marijuana or can 
voluntarily choose to break the law by continuing to smoke marijuana. In the former 
instance, if she cannot find an alternative method of pain control, she will adhere to the 
law but live in uncontrollable pain. Alternatively, in the latter instance, she will be in 
conscious violation of the law, but she will live without the pain. 
163. LeVay, supra note 124, at 728 n.208 (citing Order, United States v. Smith, 
No. S-97-558 GEB (E.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that since the defendant had not pursued 
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have recognized the logistical impracticality and unrealistic time re­
quirements of such an alternative and have, on that basis, con­
cluded that rescheduling does not represent a reasonable 
alternative.164 The defense of medical necessity should therefore be 
available in circumstances where the user lacks a reasonable alter­
native in his or her treatment of the effects of the medical malady. 
Under United States v. Bailey, the opportunity to avoid the 
threatened harm renders the necessity defense inapplicable.165 For 
seriously ill individuals using marijuana to combat pain or other 
maladies, the lack of legal alternatives represents an absence of 
choice or power to avoid the threatened harm. This lack of power 
to avoid personal injury forms a basis for the allowance of the ne­
cessity defense in cases of use or possession of marijuana for medi­
cal purposes. 
Furthermore, viewed in the textual context of the MPC, a 
choice between evils, or, stated another way, the defense of neces­
sity, is valid where the threatened injury is worse than the legal vio­
lation and where the law does not otherwise explicitly bar it.166 For 
a medical marijuana user, the potential for his or her living in con­
tinuous pain, or with some other bodily impairment that may be 
remedied by the use of marijuana,167 represents a significant 
"threatened injury." Where the legislature has not clearly man­
dated otherwise and no other legal alternative exists, the choice of 
evils doctrine should apply favorably to a defendant charged with a 
violation of the CSA because of marijuana use for medical pur­
poses, since the threatened injury to the individual of not using the 
drug is greater to that individual than the violation of the law. 
the option of rescheduling marijuana, he had "bypassed the available administrative 
procedures established by Congress to effect a change in how marijuana is classified 
under federal law"». 
164. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998) (doubting whether a rescheduling petition is a reasonable alternative for all 
seriously ill patients whose physicians recommended marijuana for therapeutic 
purposes). 
165. Bailey, 44 U.S. at 410. 
166. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985) (defining the necessity defense as a 
choice of evils where 1) the threatened injury would be worse than the legal violation, 
2) the law does not provide exceptions or defenses in the particular situation, 3) there is 
no legislation that specifically forbids the necessity defense, and 4) the actor has not 
negligently or recklessly caused the predicament which necessitated the breaking of the 
law). 
167. See supra notes 156 & 159 and accompanying text. 
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B. 	 The Purpose of Equity: Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of 
Legal Remedies168 
The formulation of an exception to the strictness of the law 
became necessary long ago, as evidenced by the equitable remedies 
doctrine that has existed since the beginning of our system of juris­
prudence.169 The Supreme Court has held that parties seeking in­
junctive relief in the federal courts must always show "irreparable 
injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies."17o Equitable jurisdic­
tion has traditionally functioned to establish a judicial framework 
through which parties in dispute may arrive at a "nice adjustment 
and reconciliation."l71 
1. Exercising Equitable Discretion 
Equity in American jurisprudence has been characterized by a 
special type of flexible judicial power: the power to examine cases 
individually and to provide remedies appropriate to the specific cir­
cumstances. "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power 
of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has 
distinguished it."l72 When considering the appropriate remedy, a 
court of equity should consider the circumstances; specifically, the 
benefits and injuries to each party resulting from the equitable judi­
cial remedyP3 Moreover, courts of equity, in exercising their dis­
cretion and employing the remedy of an injunction, must consider 
the consequences not just to the parties in dispute, but also to the 
public at largeP4 Consequently, where a court's injunction to the 
violation of a law "will adversely affect a public interest," the court 
has the discretionary power to withhold enforcement of that law, 
168. Although equitable jurisdiction can form part of an argument in support of a 
medical necessity defense, in this Note the two issues are treated separately in Parts 
III.A and III.B. 
169. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (stating that the practice 
of equitable jurisdiction has a history of several hundred years). 
170. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citing Rondeau v. 
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975». 
171. 	 Id. (quoting Hecht, 321 U.S. at ~29). 
172. 	 Id. 
173. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (stating that in equitable 
jurisdiction, "the court balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to 
them according [to how] they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the 
injunction "). 
174. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312 (stating that courts of equity should pay 
particular attention to the public consequences of their use of injunctions when exercis­
ing their discretion) (citing R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941». 
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even where "the postponement of enforcement may be burden­
some to the plaintiff."175 This practice of considering all the cir­
cumstances of a case, as well as the consequences of any decision 
upon the parties, prior to the determination of a remedy in a court 
of equitable jurisdiction is an integral part of the American system 
of jurisprudence. 176 
The prominent flexibility of equitable jurisdiction is equally ap­
plicable when a statute is at issuey7 "A grant of jurisdiction to is­
sue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so 
under any and all circumstances ... and a federal judge sitting as a 
chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for 
every violation of the law."178 
a. Bodily Integrity 
The issue of the medical use of marijuana should be viewed 
through the judicial lens of equity. Courts of equity, when consid­
ering appropriate remedies, have traditionally considered the bene­
fits and injuries to each party and to society as a whole and have 
been flexible with their judicial power, examining cases individually 
to provide remedies that are appropriate to the circumstances.179 
In the case of a person using marijuana to alleviate pain or other 
maladies, such use relates to the most basic decisions about bodily 
integrity. Such a decision involves vital implications for the individ­
ual, as well as for society at large.180 
In 1914, then-judge Cardozo underscored the importance of 
control over one's body when he stated, "Every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be 
done with his own body ...."181 The use of marijuana by adults to 
combat illness or its symptoms, particularly when alternatives are 
unavailable, lies at the heart of control of one's body. For that rea­
son, the use of marijuana for medical purposes should be examined, 
with particular emphasis, in the light of the mercy and fairness­
175. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440. 
176. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313 (stating that "[t]hese commonplace consider­
ations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a 
'practice with a background of several hundred years of history'" (quoting Hecht, 321 
U.S. at 329». 
177. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also Hecht, 321 U.S. 321. 
178. TVA, 437 U.S. at 193; Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74. 
180. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concur­
ring) (stating that the Constitution limits states' interference with such decisions). 
181. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914». 
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driven doctrine of judicial equity.182 The Supreme Court clarified 
that the Constitution extends protection to the right of control over 
one's body, when it stated that "[i]t is settled now ... that the Con­
stitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's 
most basic decisions about . . . bodily integrity."183 On these 
grounds, the medical use of marijuana should fall within the scope 
of equitable jurisdiction because disputes involving seriously ill in­
dividuals who use marijuana can lead to continued suffering, to ag­
gravation of serious medical conditions, and even to death. Such 
detrimental outcomes for these medical marijuana users directly af­
fect bodily integrity and typically result from adverse court rulings 
that deprive medical marijuana users of their only method of pain 
control or other adverse symptom control. Equitable discretion, 
thus, offers the possibility to arrive at a "nice adjustment" while 
avoiding irreparable harm to an individual. 
b. Equitable Prevention of Unnecessary Pain 
Courts of equity should have an inherent role in preventing 
irreparable harm to ordinary people who use marijuana for the re­
lief of their pain or discomfort when nothing else provides such re­
lief. Sometimes, persons suffering from a serious illness can resort 
only to marijuana for effective treatment because other alterna­
tives, legal or otherwise, are ineffective in the treatment of their 
maladies or symptoms.184 Furthermore, such seriously ill individu­
als often lack the benefit of remedies that are both legal and effec­
tive, resulting in a real threat not only to their well-being but to 
their lives as well.185 When these individuals' quality of life be­
comes almost unbearable, anything that improves their quality of 
life has a constitutional dimension.186 In such circumstances, a 
common understanding of "liberty" should encompass the right to 
182. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329 ("The qualities of mercy and practicality have 
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public 
interest and private needs ...."). 
183. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992); 
see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing a 
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment). 
184. See e.g., GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 28-33 (stating that the 
patient's doctor had been unable to find any effective drug for treating the patient's 
nausea, that the nausea was so debilitating that the patient was incapacitated, and that 
the only drug that controlled his nausea effectively was marijuana). 
185. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of effective 
drugs to treat some patients). 
186. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concur­
ring); see also id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
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mitigate, where feasible, the suffering underlying such an unbear­
able existence. "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion 
of the State. "187 In fact, "defin[ing] one's own concept of exis­
tence" is the essence of the natural law expressed in the Declara­
tion of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness."188 Accordingly, in Board of Regents 
v. Roth,189 the Court stated that it had not attempted to define the 
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution with precision because "[i]n 
a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the 
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."190 
It is a basic notion in a civilized society, and even more so in a 
free and democratic one, that individuals who are suffering, vulner­
able, or in need are to be afforded care, assistance, and understand­
ing beyond that normally afforded to others not in their 
predicament.191 In accordance with these beliefs, some members of 
the Supreme Court have articulated that the treatment of intolera­
ble pain is something to which all human beings are entitled.192 
"Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's final 
days incapacitated and in agony is certainly '[a]t the heart of [the] 
liberty ... to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'193 
So strong is our society's belief that people are entitled to com­
bat their pain that many states have enacted laws categorically au­
thorizing pain treatment even where it hastens death,194 despite the 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)) (highlighting the Supreme Court's stance that all human be­
ings are entitled to the treatment of intolerable pain). 
187. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850-51. 
188. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
189. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
190. /d. at 572. 
191. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 ("[T]he state has an interest in protecting 
vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons- from abuse, 
neglect, and mistakes."). 
192. See id. at 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 745 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
193. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of South­
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
194. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 780 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the state of 
Washington "generally permits physicians to administer medication to patients in termi­
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long and steady historical opposition to euthanasia. Not only is the 
average person entitled to exist without pain (to the extent that it is 
medically and practically feasible) but, so fundamental are Ameri­
can societal notions in this area, that they lead one to conclude, as 
did our founding fathers, that even the most horrible criminals are 
entitled to safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment.195 
It seems, therefore, that even the most vicious criminals have 
the right to be punished and to live, or even die, without pain. Few 
would argue that consciously and purposefully subjecting a con­
victed criminal to pain is acceptable in our society today. Yet many 
argue that, in certain circumstances, allowing ordinary people who 
are not convicted criminals to suffer is acceptable.196 To avoid this 
scenario, courts of equity should have an inherent role in prevent­
ing unnecessary pain to ordinary people who use marijuana for the 
relief of their pain or discomfort when nothing else provides such 
relief. To do so, courts of equity should be able to exercise their 
discretion in a manner that allows individuals who meet certain cri­
teria to medicate themselves with whatever relieves their pain, or to 
make use of the defense of necessity in furtherance of such action, 
notwithstanding the criminalization of the medication or the strict 
letter of the law. This flexibility has characterized courts of equity 
for hundreds of years.197 Additionally, this type of molding of the 
remedy to each particular case has defined the rationale for such 
nal conditions when the primary intent is to alleviate pain, even when the medication is 
so powerful as to hasten death and the patient chooses to receive it with that under­
standing"). A number of other states do the same. See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1­
2.5(a)(1) (West 1998) (exempting from assisted suicide ban licensed health care provid­
ers who administer or dispense medications or procedures to relieve pain or discomfort, 
even if such medications or procedures hasten death, unless provider intends to cause 
death); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.3.1 (West Supp. 2002) (same); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 216.304 (Michie 1998) (same); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 752.1027(3) (West Supp. 
2002) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215(3)(a) (West Supp. 2002) (same); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2133.11(A)(6), 2133.12(E)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 11-60-4(a) (2000) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37.1 (Michie 1998) (same); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(b)(2) (1997). Other states permit patients to sign in­
structions or waivers authorizing pain treatment even where it may hasten death. See, 
e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-804,5-809 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-4, 24-7A-9 (Michie 2000); S.c. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504 (Law. Co­
op. Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2984, 54.1-2988 (Michie 2002). 
195. See U.S. CaNsT. amend. VIII. 
196. See State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (preventing 
the defendant from using marijuana to obtain relief from his epilepsy seizures because 
in the opinion of the court the medical necessity defense ran counter to legislative in­
tent); see also State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 946-47 (N.J. 1986) (preventing the defen­
dant's use of marijuana to ease severe spasms associated with quadriplegia). 
197. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
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courts since the beginning of our system of jurisprudence.198 
In some instances, equity demands that a human being who is 
suffering, vulnerable,or in need be allowed to use marijuana to re­
lieve his or her pain or discomfort, if such an allowance is the only 
legal remedy and thus the only way to prevent both the "inade­
quacy of legal remedies" and "irreparable injury."199 This assertion 
rests on the very purpose of the doctrine of equitable jurisdiction­
to alleviate the inadequacy of existing legal remedies2oo-and that 
courts of equity exercise their discretion on the basis of the facts of 
each case.201 A society that calls for the existence of courts of eq­
uity can hardly refuse equity's application in instances where peo­
ple are in pain. It is difficult to envision circumstances more 
demanding of, or appropriate for, an equitable remedy than the al­
lowance of pain control where, absent such allowance, the applica­
tion of the strict letter of the law results in preventable human 
suffering. 
Allowance of the medical necessity defense in cases where the 
medical use of marijuana results in violation of the CSA thus pre­
vents, in certain instances, the irreparable harm and suffering that 
results from the application of the strict letter of the CSA. Moreo­
ver, it does so without the judicial need to overrule the CSA in its 
entirety. Furthermore, a court sitting in equity is best suited to 
weigh and balance the factors it deems proper in its consideration 
of an equitable remedy.202 The court should consider the benefits 
and detriments to the individual of marijuana use by a seriously ill 
person as well as the benefits and detriments to the public at large 
of that person's use.2°3 Whether or not the court should exercise its 
198. Id. 
199. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). 
200. Id. (quoting Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329). 
201. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329. 
202. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). 
203. Id. New figures released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2001 show an 
on-going rate of growth for state and federal prisoners. However, in contrast to the 
relatively stable growth of state prison populations of 0.3%, the federal prison count is 
rising at an alarming rate of 8%. This primarily reflects the continuing general impact 
of federal drug policies, and marijuana policies in particular, reflected in the fact that 
drug offenders constitute 57% of federal prisoners. As a specific illustration of the 
impact of marijuana users upon the total incarceration count, in the year 2000, of the 
1,579,566 total drug-related arrests, 46.5%, or 734,497, were for marijuana violations 
alone. Of these, 646,042, or 88%, were for simple possession, the category including 
medical marijuana users. THE SENTENCING PROJECf, NEW PRISON POPULATION 
FIGURES: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY (2002), available at www.sentencingproject.org! 
newslbjsreport-july2002.pdf. 
To contrast the societal effects of these numbers with other western or populous 
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equitable discretion and allow the individual to use marijuana, even 
in violation of the law, should then be decided on the basis of the 
weight of the interests .of the seriously ill person versus those of 
society in general, as equitably balanced by the court.204 In such 
instances, courts of equity would consider this analysis on a case-by­
case basis.205 Whether the court finds that an equitable exception 
to the violation of drug laws in such cases is warranted, judicial tra­
dition supports the application of equitable remedies when the po­
tential exists for irreparable harm to an individual or adverse 
consequences to the public. 
2. 	 Equitable Discretion and CSA Language: Imputed 
Knowledge and Statutory Ambiguity 
Given the American legal system's long tradition of equitable 
discretion, when Congress enacts laws, it presumably does so with 
an understanding of the principles of equitable jurisdiction, "a prac­
tice of which Congress is assuredly well aware."206 Therefore, Con­
gress must be imputed with the knowledge that, absent clear 
language to the contrary, equitable principles should, and will, ap­
ply to the interpretation of a statute such as the CSA. Accordingly, 
given the absence in the CSA of clear language to the contrary, 
Congress cannot be said to have intended to bar the use of the nied­
ical necessity defense in a case where the defendant is a seriously ill 
person charged with marijuana use or possession in violation of the 
CSA. 
Furthermore, the ambiguous statutory language of the CSA, 
nations, a 1999 Justice Policy Institute study found that in the United States, 52.7% of 
state prison inmates, 73.7% of jail inmates, and 87.6% of federal inmates were jailed for 
non-violent offenses (including drug-related offenses). John Irwin, Ph.D., Vincent 
Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, America's One Million Nonviolent Prisoners (Just. Pol'y 
Inst., D.C.) Mar. 1999, available at http://www.cjcj.orgipubs!one_millionlonemiliion. 
html. The non-violent prisoner population of the United States is three times the com­
bined violent and non-violent prisoner population of the entire European Union (pos­
sessing a combined general population of 370 million, compared to the U.S. population 
of 274 million). Id. The study also found that the number of non-violent prisoners in 
the U.S. is five times the number of people held in India's entire prison system, even 
though India has a population four times that of the U.S. Id. 
As a further illustration of the negative effects upon the public at large, the report 
found that the costs involved with the incarceration of non-violent offenders in 1998 
($24 billion) exceeded the entire federal welfare budget ($16.6 billion), which provides 
support for some 8.5 million Americans, and that the U.S. spends more in building 
prisons ($2.6 billion) than universities ($2.5 billion). Id. 
204. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440. 
205. /d. 
206. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313. 
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made apparent in OCBC through the obvious interpretive disagree­
ment among the Justices,207 should be sufficient to invoke the full 
effect of the Court's equitable discretion in the determination of a 
remedy that avoids irreparable harm to the defendant. The Su­
preme Court has held that "the comprehensiveness of this equitable 
jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear 
and valid legislative command. "208 The Court, in Weinberger v. Ro
mero-Barcelo, emphasized this point when it stated: 
Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and ines­
capable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the 
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. 
'The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should 
not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'209 
In OCBC, the disagreement among the Justices regarding 
whether the CSA allows the common law defense of necessity illus­
trates the inherent ambiguity and doubtful construction of the CSA 
and its lack of clear language. While four Justices construed CSA 
language to bar the use of the necessity defense, three others inter­
preted the CSA text to potentially allow for it. This statutory ambi­
guity demonstrates an absence of "clear and valid legislative 
command" and should provide sufficient grounds for the judicial 
exercise of equitable discretion in order for courts to allow the de­
fense of medical necessity in cases where a user of medical mari­
juana violates the CSA. 
C. 	 One of the Happy Incidents of the Federal System: Why Use 
and Possession Should Be Distinguished from 
Distribution and Manufacture of Medical Marijuana 
The essence of the doctrine of federalism is embodied in the 
popular modern movement in the United States toward the legali­
zation of marijuana as a medicine.210 Nine states, with more than 
207. 	 See supra Part II.B.; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 
U.S. 483, 496 (2001). 
208. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 
395, 398 (1946». 
209. 	 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503 (1836». 
210. See Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutional­
ism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 801-807 (1997) (stating that the ballot initiative (1) serves to 
keep government closer to the people it is meant to serve; (2) allows for diversity and 
experimentation among the states, in accordance with Justice Brandeis' vision of labo­
ratories of experimentation; and (3) keep government more competent and effective by 
allowing the states to govern the daily lives of its citizens). 
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20% of the nation's population, have passed ballot initiatives which 
legalize the medical use of marijuana and are, as a result, in conflict 
with federal law prohibiting the use or possession of marijuana for 
any purpose.211 "Between 1978 and 1996, legislatures in 34 states 
and the District of Columbia passed laws recognizing marijuana's 
therapeutic value.212 Twenty-three of these laws remain in effect 
today."213 If the courts do not distinguish the use and possession 
from the manufacture and distribution of medical marijuana under 
the CSA, these states will face the same obstacles as California 
faced when it implemented Prop 215. 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Lopez214 
and United States v. Morrison,215 illustrate the Court's continued 
commitment to the principles embodied in the doctrine of federal­
ism.216 In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist began the majority opin­
211. Arizona and California voters approved medical marijuana laws in 1996. See 
NORML, MEDICAL USE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at httpllwww.norml.orglin­
dex.cfm?Group_ID=3387 (last updated Dec. 16, 2002). Voters in Alaska, Oregon, and 
Washington approved similar laws in 1998. Id. District of Columbia voters approved a 
similar initiative in 1998 by a 69% margin, but Congress invalidated the law. Id. Voters 
in Maine approved a medical marijuana law in 1999. Id. In Hawaii, the Senate ap­
proved a bill that protects seriously ill patients who use marijuana medically from local 
and state prosecution. It was signed into law on June 14, 2000, by Governor Cayetano. 
Id. In 2000, Nevada and Colorado citizens passed similar medical marijuana initiatives. 
See NORML, MEDICAL MARIJUANA INITIATIVES PASS IN COLORADO AND NEVADA; 
CALIFORNIANS PASS INITIATIVE To KEEP NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS OUT OF 
JAIL, at httpllwww.norml.orglnews/archives/00-ll-09.sctml. Also worthy of note is the 
fact that no state has rejected an initiative that solely addressed medical marijuana. 
212. See NORML, STATEMENT ON THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA: SCIENCE 
SUPPORTS AMENDING FEDERAL LAW, at httpllwww.norml.orglmedical/index.html. 
These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecti­
cut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachu­
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten­
nessee, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. Id. 
213. Id. These states are Alabama, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Ver­
mont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
214. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
215. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
216. In both cases, the Supreme Court refused to accept, as a basis for the exer­
cise of commerce powers, the effects upon the national economy of either gun posses­
sion near schools or violence against women. In Lopez, a federal grand jury indicted 
Alfonso Lopez, a twelfth-grade student who brought a gun to school, under the Gun­
Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"), Pub. L No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codi­
fied as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921,922,924). The GFSZA made it a federal crime for 
"any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows ... 
is a school zone." 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme 
Court held that the GFSZA was unconstitutional because it "neither regulates a com­
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ion with a foreword on federalism principles. He stated that "[w]e 
start with first principles," and quoting James Madison, reminded 
us that "[t]he powers delegated ... to the federal government are 
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State govern­
ments are numerous and indefinite."217 Justice Rehnquist also 
stressed that "a healthy balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse 
from either front."218 In the same spirit, Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor emphasized in their concurrence that "[w]ere the Fed­
eral Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of 
traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regu­
lation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres 
of federal and state authority would blur and ·political responsibility 
would become illusory."219 Similarly, in Morrison, the Court re­
jected the "argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, vi­
olent criminal conduct solely based on that conduct's aggregate 
effect on interstate commerce."220 The majority emphasized that 
"[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly na­
tional and what is truly local."221 
CSA prohibitions that interfere with California's medical mari­
juana laws should be viewed as being inconsistent with fundamental 
principles of federalism.222 First, the CSAregulates in traditional 
mercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way 
to interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The Court stated that, were it to 
accept the government's argument and aggregate non-economic conduct to arrive at 
interstate commercial activity, it would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an 
individual that Congress is without power to regulate." Id. at 564. 
In Morrison, a female student brought suit under § 13981 of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.c. §§ 13981-14040 (1996), against two male students. The 
Supreme Court invalidated § 13981, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, enacted to compensate 
for the inadequacy of state court remedies afforded to victims of gender motivated vio­
lence, id. at 620. The Court applied the reasoning in Lopez, stating that federalism 
principles underlined the Lopez majority's analysis and that to allow the expansion of 
congressional reach would "completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction be­
tween national and local authority." Id. at 615. 
217. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961». 
218. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991». 
219. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577. 
220. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18. 
221. Id. 
222. See Conant v. Walters, 2002 WL 31415494, at *8 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2002) 
("Our decision is consistent with principles of federalism that have left the states as the 
primary regulators of professional conduct.") While Conant was decided primarily on 
First Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit also relied on the limiting principles of 
federalism doctrine, and cited Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) ("recogniz­
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areas of state concern. Second, its prohibitions undermine one of 
the essential advantages of the federalist structure of the U.S. gov­
ernment-that individual states act as laboratories of social experi­
mentation where they can legislate in the manner that best suits 
their citizens and their circumstances. Thus, courts should allow the 
defense of necessity in cases that involve the use or possession of 
medical marijuana because such allowance permits the enforcement 
of the CSA in a manner consistent with these principles of 
federalism. 
1. Interference with Powers Reserved to the States 
While federalism principles have played a major role in Ameri­
can government for over two centuries, serving to limit the incur­
sion by the federal government upon state affairs, critics assert that 
these limitations have grown weaker over the years and the incur­
sions have increased dangerously.223 As a consequence of this con­
tinuing federal intrusion, some areas of traditional state control 
have become subject to federal control. The CSA is just one exam­
ple. Whereas states have traditionally had, under their general po­
lice powers, the right to regulate and control public health, safety, 
welfare, and morals,224 the CSA intrudes upon the states' control of 
these areas.225 The use of marijuana generally implicates all four 
police powers since the consequences or implications of marijuana 
use affect health, safety, crime, and morals. More. particularly, 
however, the use of marijuana for medical purposes conspicuously 
implicates public health and welfare directly,226 and the drug's 
criminalization strongly implicates crime control, also a tradition­
ing states broad police powers to regulate the administration of drugs by health profes­
sionals"), and Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5,18 (1925) (holding that "direct control 
of medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government"), as 
additional support for its holding that California doctors are allowed to recommend 
medical marijuana under the authority of Prop 215. 
223. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,588 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]II that stands between the remaining essentials of state 
sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."). 
224. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
225. See U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 532 U.S. 483, 487 (2001) (stat­
ing that the federal government was seeking to "enjoin the Cooperative from distribut­
ing and manufacturing marijuana ... wheti).er or not the Cooperative's activities are 
legal under California law, they violate federal law ... specifically ... the [CSA]"). 
226. California's Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, is codified 
in CAL. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West 1996) (emphasis added to the title of the 
code). 
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ally recognized function of the states under their police powers.227 
Moreover, whereas in Lopez and Morrison Congress at­
tempted to enact, and the federal government to enforce, a federal 
law that was intended to exist alongside state law,228 the issue of the 
co-existence of federal and state laws is significantly different when 
it comes to medical marijuana. Through its enforcement of the 
CSA, the federal government intends to preclude the states from 
exercising their will altogether where there is a clash between state 
laws which authorize the medical use of marijuana and the CSA 
which prohibits such use.229 Federalism principles demand that 
powers not conferred on the federal government belong to the 
states.230 
On the basis of this allocation of powers, CSA provisions that 
interfere with California's medical marijuana laws should be consid­
ered inconsistent with federalism principles because California is 
exercising its police powers in an area traditionally of state con­
cern.231 The conflict with federalism principles is illustrated by the 
fact that, although California has expressly authorized the use of 
medical marijuana in certain circumstances, the implementation of 
such laws is barred under the CSA. Therefore, the CSA's interfer­
ence with California law is at odds with the Supreme Court's long­
established recognition that states retain their police powers as part 
of the division of powers which form part of the federalism 
doctrine.232 
227. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (describing the constitu­
tional framework of our government divided among the national government and the 
states). 
228. In Morrison, the provision of a federal civil remedy for victims of gender­
motivated violence did not interfere with similar state provisions, providing additional 
protection beyond that provided by state statutes. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 601-02 (2000). 
229. c.t Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
230. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8 (specifying the powers of the federal government); see 
also U.S. CaNST. amend. X (reserving for the states those powers not delegated by the 
Constitution to the federal government). 
231. Judge Alex Kozinski of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, one of three judges 
assigned to rule on the government's appeal to crack down on doctors who recommend 
marijuana for medical use, stated, "Why in this world does an administration that's 
committed to federalism want to go to this length to put doctors in jail for doing things 
that are perfectly legal under state law?" Claire Cooper, Effort to Muzzle Pro-pot Doc­
tors Argued in Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 9, 2002, available at www.freedomto 
exhale.com/sab.htm. 
232. See Anna Johnson Cramer, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: A 
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REv. 271, 288 
(2000). According to the Executive Director of NORML, Keith Stroup, the problem­
atic nature of this interference, and Congress' manifested concern in that regard, is well 
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The Supreme Court unanimously held in OeBe that the fed­
eral government has the power to regulate the distribution and 
manufacture of marijuana and that the medical necessity defense is 
not available because Congress had not authorized it in the CSA.233 
However, the Court has strong legal grounds on which to distin­
guish OeBe from a case involving charges of use or possession of 
marijuana brought against a seriously ill individual using the drug 
for medical purposes. In contrast to the manufacture and distribu­
tion of the drug, control over the use or possession of marijuana for 
medical purposes is tied to governmental functions-the regulation 
of health and safety-that the Court has traditionally recognized as 
within the purview of states' police powers.234 
Moreover, the Court should distinguish distribution and manu­
facture from use and possession of medical marijuana in cases re­
lated to CSA prohibitions against the use of marijuana and, more 
specifically, the defense of medical necessity in such cases, on the 
basis of a principle articulated by Justice Brandeis in 1932: the im­
portant role of laboratories for novel social experiments in the fur­
therance of our democracy.235 
2. Laboratories of Social Experimentation 
In creating a form of government in which the powers of the 
federal government were limited and non-enumerated powers were 
reserved to the states, the founding fathers recognized that all fifty 
illustrated by the fact that on July 23, 2001, a mere two months after the Supreme Court 
ruling in DCBC, the States' Rights to Medical Marijuana Act was introduced into the 
United States Congress "to amend federal law so that states that wish to permit the 
legal use of marijuana as a medicine for seriously ill patients may do so, without inter­
ference from the federal government." Press Release, NORML, Congressional Alert 
on Medial Marijuana, at www.norml.orglindex.cfm?Group_ID=5347 (last updated Dec. 
9, 2002). The Act, originally introduced in July 2001, was referred to the Health Sub­
committee of the Energy and Commerce Committee. H.R. 2592, 107th Congo (1st Sess. 
2001). However, "[d]espite bipartisan co-sponsorship from 36 members of Congress, 
the committee failed to schedule a hearing or vote on H.R. 2592, effectively cutting off 
all Congressional debate on the proposal." Id. On July 24, 2002, Representatives Bar­
ney Frank (D-Ma.), Ron Paul (R-Tex.), Dana Rohrabacher (R-Cal.), and Janice 
Schakowsky (D-Ill.) joined former Ronald Reagan presidential aide Lyn Nofziger and 
seriously ill patients in a Capitol Hill press conference calling on Congress to act on the 
Bill. Id. 
233. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 493-94 
(2001). 
234. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 224-27 (discussing the line be­
tween state sovereignty and Congress). 
235. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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states need not enact the same laws, but that each could develop its 
own laws consistent with its particular circumstances.236 The issue 
of the use of marijuana for medical purposes affects different states 
in different ways and to different extents. For example, whereas in 
California about fourteen persons per 100,000 suffer from AIDS, in 
Wyoming, only two person per 100,000 does.237 Given these differ­
ences, it makes sense that the approach taken to combat the disease 
collectively, as well as to combat the symptoms individually, might 
be different in the two states. 
Justice Brandeis identified the existence of differences among 
states and their populations, and found a well-suited, built-in mech­
anism in the American form of government to address this diver­
sity.238 He stated, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi­
ments without risk to the rest of the country."239 
The notion of the states as "laboratories" has at least two as­
pects.240 First, after thorough testing in a variety of contexts, a na­
tional solution will emerge that is suitable for implementation in 
every state.241 Second, based on American notions of pluralism242 
and re1ativism,243 and given the wide variations in conditions and 
preferences in a country as diverse as ours, different solutions may 
be best for different states.244 
236. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 3 (1987) (defin­
ing federalism as a division of power between the federal government and state govern­
ments). See also infra notes 238-39; New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 280-311 (Brandeis, 1., 
dissenting). 
237. Centers for Disease Control, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, SURVEY 
REPORT VOL. 13, No.2 table 2, available at http://www.cdc.govlhiv/stats/hasr1302/ta­
ble2.htm. 
238. See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 310-11. 
239. Id. at 311. 
240. See DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85 (1995). 
241. Id. 
242. Pluralism is defined as "a view that theories of what is right and good are 
relative in that ethical truths depend upon the individuals and groups holding them. 
. . . " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1916 (3d ed. 1976). 
243. Relativism is defined as "a metaphysical theory that there are more than 
one... kind[ 1of ultimate reality" or "a state or condition of society in which members 
of diverse ethnic, racial, religious or social groups maintain an autonomous participa­
tion in ... their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common 
civilization." Id. at 1745. 
244. SHAPIRO, supra note 240. 
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a. Adherence to the Laboratories Design 
When Congress exerts its power over the states and deliber­
ately overturns the will of a state or its people, it should only do so 
in a manner acceptable in the light of our "laboratories" design. 
The legalization of marijuana for medical purposes in the United 
States is becoming an increasingly popular idea, and greater num­
bers of people support the concept every day.245 As Justice Stevens 
reminded the majority in GCBC, "[R]espect [for the sovereign 
states] imposes a duty on federal courts, whenever possible, to 
avoid or minimize conflict between federal and state law ...."246 
When the federal government refuses to acknowledge actions 
of the people in a state and of a state itself, fundamental concepts of 
federalism are undermined.247 Federalism principles require the di­
vision of government powers through their apportionment between 
the federal and state governments.248 The very purpose of our dual 
system of government is to restrain either government from intrud­
ing upon the protected freedoms of the people.249 One of the goals 
of federalism is to accomplish this task through the particular allo­
cation of responsibilities and powers to the state governments and, 
separately, to the federal government.250 When one government 
pushes out beyond its prescribed boundaries, it invades the allotted 
territory of the other and, by so doing, erodes the barriers to abu­
245. NORML, FAVORABLE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLLS 1995-2000, at http:// 
www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4457 (last updated Dec. 16, 2002). Gallop Poll, 
March 1999 (73% of respondents support "making marijuana legally available to doc­
tors to prescribe"); CNN Interactive Poll, April 1999 (96% of respondents said they 
"support the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes"); Journal of American Medicine 
Association Poll, conducted by Harvard School of Public Health, March 1998 (60% of 
respondents "supported allowing physicians to prescribe medical marijuana"); ABC 
NewslDiscovery News Poll, May 1997 (69% of respondents favored "legalizing [the] 
medical use of marijuana"). Id. 
246. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 502. 
247. See New State lee, 285 U.S. at 311 ("To stay experimentation in things social 
and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.") 
248. United States v. Lopez, 519 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
249. See generally BERGER, supra note 236, at 131; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. 
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It 
was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one 
state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.") (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
250. See aCBC, 532 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 532; 
see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,615,617 (2000) (articulating that Con­
gress must exercise its power so as to preserve the distinction between national and 
local authority, a distinction that was designed "so that the people's rights would be 
secured by the division of power"). 
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sive government-precisely the consequence that the founders of 
our nation intended to avoid, or at least minimize.251 
To the extent that the people of the individual states are mak­
ing their wishes known through their actions at the ballot box, the 
federal government has a responsibility to comply with those wishes 
or, at the very least, minimize the potential conflict between the 
wishes of the people and its own actions.252 "The Framers recog­
nized that the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of 
government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for 
dealing with them. This is as true today as it was when the Consti­
tution was adopted."253 
As democratic as local representative governments are, as 
compared to federal government, referendums and initiatives are 
even more democratic. Such popular ballot measures allow citizens 
to raise and vote on issues important to them that, in many in­
stances, lack sufficient political support, or are too controversial, to 
be addressed by 1egislatures.254 Prop 215 and the many other initia­
tives and referendums dealing with medical marijuana255 represent 
this type of lawmaking. These medical marijuana initiatives would 
not have been enacted absent the direct promotion and participa­
tion by the populace. 
In some instances, the voice of the people has directly contra­
dicted the voice of the legislature. For example, in 1996, the citi­
zens of Arizona passed Proposition 200256 only to have the Arizona 
251. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
252. See OCBC, 532 U.S. at 500-02 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
253. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
254. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects 
of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 149, 168 (1996) ("[Tlhe 
initiative system allows issues to be considered by the populace and not by elected 
officials with their own, particular self-interests .... [Ilnitiative lawmaking empowers a 
type of constituency that is represented very differently in a more republican form of 
government. "). 
255. Since 1996, initiatives allowing for the medical use of marijuana have been 
placed on ballots in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washing­
ton, and the District of Columbia. See Election '98: The Vote For Medical Marijuana 
And Drug Policy Reform (Drug Pol'y Found., D.C. 1998), at 5, available at http://www. 
drcnet.org/election98/elections98.html (offering an in-depth description of 1998 ballot 
initiatives). 
256. Proposition 200, Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996, 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3412.01 (2001) was approved by Arizona voters on November 5, 
1996. Proposition 200 amended title 13, chapter 9 of the Arizona Revised Statutes by 
adding § 13-901.01, which allows "any person who is convicted of the personal posses­
sion or use of" marijuana to be eligible for probation. § 13-901.01(A). 
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legislature essentially invalidate the initiative through amend­
ments.257 However, the people, two years later in 1998, placed on 
the ballot and passed the same proposition, this time, with an addi­
tional provision barring the legislature from invalidating it again.258 
Proposition 200 illustrates how the popular political participation 
mechanisms of referendums and initiatives serve to constrain the 
ever-present threat of abusive, unresponsive, or unrepresentative 
government. Thus, as the Arizona legislature had to abide by the 
clear mandate from its citizens, so should the federal government: 
where the citizens of a state have expressed their position on an 
issue that falls within the purview of state powers, as Californians 
did on the use of medical marijuana, the federal government should 
respect the wishes of that state. 
b. Sustaining the American Form of Government 
The idea that ours is a government of the people and for the 
people exists hand in hand with basic concepts of democracy: 
elected officials represent the wishes and needs of the people.259 
As a result of this fundamental principle embedded in the Ameri­
can tradition, American people deeply value their right to political 
participation in the election of their government representatives. 
In this context, American democracy is like a tree whose roots 
are the principles of federalism, constantly watered by the electoral 
involvement of the people: a tree that, like any other, would wither 
absent watering. When the people feel disenfranchised (whether 
they are or not is irrelevant), they lose faith in the idea that their 
representatives and their government exist by the people and to do 
the peoples' work.260 When this occurs, the populace withdraws 
from the political process. 
The people may withdraw as a consequence of their distrust in 
a government seemingly pursuing its own agendas or driven by ulte­
rior motives; or they may withdraw as a result of their disgust with 
specific policies or perhaps to demonstrate their disapproval of 
257. See Tanyanika Samuels, The Pot Prescription, NEWSDAY, Oct. 14, 1997, at 
cs. 
258. See Martin Van Der Werf, Hull Wins, Dems Hold On; Medical Marijuana 
Again Has Voter Support, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1998, at AI. 
259. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Govern­
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed."). 
260. See SHAPIRO, supra note 240, at 111 (stating that "[t]he political integrity of 
a republican form of government ... center[s] on the accountability of elected repre­
sentatives to their electorate"). 
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what they view as unfair or corrupt government conduct,261 
Whatever the cause may be, the final result is the same: the popu­
lace retreats from political involvement, the government becomes 
increasingly less "of the people and for the people," and democracy 
and freedom gradually wither away.262 
As this erosion progresses, elected officials become increas­
ingly detached from their constituencies, and their accountability to 
their constituencies diminishes. This process fosters an environ­
ment where corruption and special interests preside over trans­
parency and legitimacy.263 This road can quickly lead to a 
breakdown in the fabric of our free society.264 
Perhaps, given enough time, this represents the inescapable 
evolution of the American system of government. However, as Jus­
tice Brandeis pointed out, our system of federalism derives a great 
benefit from "one of its happy incidents": the built-in mechanism of 
our laboratories of experimentation, through which the people may 
try "novel social and economic experiments."265 The flexibility and 
versatility embodied in the laboratories concept, which exists as an 
intrinsic part of our dual system of government, is easy to underesti­
mate. This vast potential for experimentation in numerous aspects 
of American society,266 within the bounds of the Constitution, pro­
261. In 2000, approximately 51 % of eligible voters voted in the presidential elec­
tion. In 1996, a mere 49% cast their votes, the lowest turn out in over 70 years. In the 
1998 congressional election, only 36.4% of the electorate cast its vote, down from 38.8 
in 1994. CENTER FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY, VOTER TURNOUT, available at www.fair 
vote.orglturnout! (last modified Nov. 22, 2002). 
262. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of tradi­
tional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activ­
ities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and 
political responsibility would become illusory.") 
263. See supra notes 252, 259 and accompanying text. 
264. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,386 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
265. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
266. There have been thousands of initiatives, referendums, and recalls in various 
States pertaining to numerous issues since the initiative process was first adopted in 
1898. BALLOT WATCH, THE HOT ISSUES (1999), at www.ballotwatch.orglhotissues.htm. 
For example, in 1998 there were 235 statewide ballot questions on general election bal­
lots in 44 states. Of these, 55 were initiatives, 6 popular referendums, and 174 legisla­
tive referendums. [d. Of the 235 ballot questions, 160 were constitutional 
amendments, 51 were statutes, 15 were bond issues, 6 were popular referendums, two 
were non-binding advisory votes, and one was a constitutional convention question. Id. 
In total, the voters approved 177 of the 235 statewide ballot questions, a passage rate of 
75%. [d. 
As examples of the varied issues raised in ballot measures, Maine voters rejected a 
partial birth abortion initiative (44%-56%), but approved a medical marijuana initiative 
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vides a means to overcome the aforementioned erosion of our free 
society and avoids the resulting "serious consequences to the 
Nation."267 
From time to time, human tendencies or political forces may 
lead the government down flawed paths, fueled by unforeseen or 
sudden incidents or discoveries, and steered by zealot "patriots" 
awaiting the proper environment in which to flourish. However, 
armed with our fifty laboratories of societal experimentation, our 
system is primed to provide limitless options to limitless predica­
ments through innovative approaches to small and large problems 
alike.268 The extent to which an innovative approach would then 
propagate throughout our union, from state to state, and the value 
that Americans as a people eventually place on it, would be deter­
mined solely by the approach's effectiveness as a solution to the 
problem at hand.269 In this sense, it is not surprising that Justice 
Brandeis called this feature of our federalist system of government 
a "happy incident." It is arguably one of its most important 
qualities.270 
Accordingly, when Congress exerts its power over the states 
and deliberately overturns the will of a state or its people, its ac­
tions should be acceptable and supportable only in light of our "lab­
oratories" design. The courts should carefully scrutinize such 
congressional action to prevent the erosion of the separation of 
powers secured by federalism principles. The legitimacy of the 
medical use of marijuana should fall within the purview of these 
laboratories of social experimentation, given the health, safety, and 
welfare aspects of the issue and the traditional inclusion of these 
interests within areas of state responsibility. 
The right to a defense of medical necessity should also fall 
within the purview of traditional areas of state responsibility be­
cause it represents the type of "novel social experiment" that Jus­
(61 %-39%); Mississippi voters rejected a state legislator term limits initiative (45%­
55%); Alabama voters rejected a legislative referendum to start a state lottery (46%­
54 %); Washington state voters approved an initiative to revamp the car registration fee 
method (57%-43%); and Washington voters rejected an initiative to ban commercial 
net fishing (40%-60%). Id. 
267. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
268. Id. 
269. Presently, more than 51 million Americans, or approximately 19% of the 
U.S. population, live in the eight states where medical marijuana users are protected by 
state law. NORML, MEDICAL USE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http//www. 
norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3387 (last updated Dec. 16, 2002). 
270. See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311. 
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tice Brandeis considered so worthy of promotion and protection. 
Interference by the federal government with persons attempting to 
use marijuana for medical purposes in states that have decriminal­
ized such action constitutes nothing less than interference with our 
laboratories of experimentation. 
Medical marijuana, and the use of the medical necessity de­
fense in its context, are just two experiments among many going on 
today in our "laboratories of societal experimentation." However, 
every instance where the federal government inhibits the states' in­
herent tendency to serve as laboratories undermines this important 
tool and diminishes its effectiveness as a control to the erosion of 
our republic. The CSA should not interfere with the use of a de­
fense of medical necessity by a seriously ill person who uses mari­
juana for medical purposes under Prop 215. In the long run, this 
type of federal interference with state law fosters the destruction of 
our free and democratic society ~ 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrines of equity and choice of evils, as well as the fun­
damental principle of federalism, command the allowance of the 
medical necessity defense in cases of use and possession of medical 
marijuana. On the basis of these principles, a distinction exists be­
tween the enforcement of the CSA where the distribution and man­
ufacturing of marijuana is at issue and its enforcement where the 
use or possession of marijuana for medical purposes is at issue. 
The Supreme Court, in its majority and concurring opinions in 
GCBC, identified issues that are relevant regarding that distinction. 
Sooner or later, the Supreme Court will likely address the question 
of the use or possession of marijuana in violation of the CSA by a 
seriously ill patient for whom marijuana is a necessity. When it 
does, the Court should allow the use of the medical necessity de­
fense because such allowance is required by the doctrines of equita­
ble jurisdiction, choice of evils, federalism, and an individual's right 
to pain relief. Additionally, such allowance is required by the 
Court's prior case law relating to these doctrines; and because such 
allowance is not inconsistent with the Court's holding in GCBe. 
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